The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget de…cits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we …nd no evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget de…cits are systematically voted out of o¢ ce in a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement …scal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of o¢ ce "despite" having reduced the de…cits. In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce de…cits decisively avoiding an electoral defeat.
Introduction
The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget de…cits (which we label "…scal adjustments") is that they are the kiss of death for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In certain countries spending cuts are very unpopular, in others tax increases are politically more costly but everywhere, the story goes, …scal rigor is always unpopular.
The empirical evidence on this point is much less clear cut than the conviction with which this conventional wisdom is held. In the present paper, in fact, we …nd no evidence that governments which reduce budget de…cits even decisively are systematically voted out of o¢ ce. We also take into consideration as carefully as possible issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement …scal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of o¢ ce "despite" having reduced the de…cits. Even taking this possibility into account we still …nd no evidence that …scal adjustments, even decisive ones, systematically, on average, imply electoral defeats.
In the present paper our focus is especially in large …scal adjustments, which are currently at the center of attention in many OECD countries. As a moti-vation we begin by examining the evidence on the ten largest multi-year …scal adjustments in the last 30 years in OECD countries. We …nd no evidence that the turnover of governments in those periods was signi…cantly higher than the average of the entire sample. In fact it was lower. 1 We then explore more systematically all cases of large adjustments (de…ned as a reduction of at least 1.5 per cent of GDP of cyclically adjusted de…cits). Once again we …nd no evidence of a negative e¤ect on election prospects. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we …nd some evidence that …scally loose government tend to loose election more often than average, a result which is consistent with Brander and Drazen (2008) . Next, we present a battery of regressions which show that indeed these results are quite robust and the data do not exhibit any correlation between de…cit reduction and electoral losses.
But what about reverse causality? Perhaps weak governments, knowing their vulnerability, do not implement adjustments, but then, precisely because they are weak, they loose at polls, and the reverse holds for strong governments. This would explain the lack of correlation between …scal adjustments and reelection. Unfortunately measuring the "strength" of a government is not easy; often such strength or weakness depends on personalities involved, leadership style etc. which are impossible for the econometrician to observe and measure. For instance, in principle a coalition government may be weaker and more unstable than a single party government, but certain coalitions may be especially cohesive and certain single party government may hide strong division within the same party. The margin of the majority of the government in the legislature may be an other indicator, but that too could be imperfect, due for instance, to divisions within the government coalition even though the latter may have a large majority of seats. We …nd no evidence of a di¤erent behavior in terms of …scal adjustments of coalition versus single party governments. At the very least we can conclude that many governments can tackle decisively budget de…cits without electoral losses. Perhaps not all, but a good portion can. 2 If it is the case that …scal adjustments do not lead systematically to electoral defeats why do they often seem so politically di¢ cult? We can think of two explanations. The …rst one is simply risk aversion. Incumbent governments may be afraid of "rocking the boat" and follow a cautious course of actions and postpone …scal reforms. The second and perhaps more plausible one is that the political game played around a …scal adjustment goes above and beyond a one man one vote elections. Alesina and Drazen (1991) present a model in which organized groups with a strong in ‡uence on the polity manage to postpone reforms, even when the latter are necessary and unavoidable, to try to switch the costs on their opponents. The resulting wars of attrition delays …scal adjustments. Strikes, contributions from various lobbies, press campaigns are all means which can enforce (or block) policies above and beyond voting at the polls. For example imagine a public sector union that goes on strike to block reduction in government spending on the public wage bill. They may create disruptions and may have consequences which may be too costly to bear for a government. Not only, but public sector unions may have connections with parts of the incumbent coalition and block …scal adjustments. Similar considerations may lead to postponements of pension reforms. In many countries pensioners developed a strong political support even within workers' unions. The latter would then water down the adjustment to placate this particular lobby even though the "median voter" might have been favorable to the tighter …scal policy. To put it more broadly, voting in elections is not the only way in which various lobbies and pressure groups can in ‡uence the political process. Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) present a battery of tests on electoral reform in large sample of countries which are consistent with the empirical implications of the war of attrition model.
The paper closest to the present one in spirit is Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998). These authors, using data up to the mid nineties, found inconclusive evidence on the e¤ects of …scal adjustments on reelections in OECD economies. A related literature is the one on political budget cycles which asks the question of whether incumbent governments increase spending or cut taxes before elections in order to be rewarded at the polls, an argument which implies that budget de…cits are popular and budget cuts are not. 3 Persson and Tabellini (2000) suggested that only in certain types of electoral systems political budget cycles are present. However Brander and Drazen (2005) show in fact that while political budget cycles are common in new democracies (like in Central and Eastern Europe) they are not the norm in established one, where increases in de…cits tend to reduce the electoral success for the incumbents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie ‡y describe our data. Section 3 presents some suggestive qualitative evidence on the largest multi year …scal adjustments in the OECD countries in the last 30 years. Section 4 discusses more formally the correlations between de…cit reduction policies and electoral results. Section 5 addresses the question of potential reverse causality. The last section concludes.
Data
Our data sources are standard. For economic variables we use OECD Economic Outlook Database no.84. For political-institutional variables we use the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2009. In particular we focus on the period 1975-2008. The countries are the members of the OECD which have been such for the entire period; the ones we analysed in our work are 19: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
The precise de…nition of all our variables is extensively described in Appendix, but for ease of exposition we also rede…ne them as we encounter them in the paper. Speci…cally, all the variables corrected for the cycle are calculated using the cyclical adjusted variables of OECD Economic Outlook Database, and variation of cyclical adjusted variables are calculated over the potential output of total economy. In particular we used OECD reviewed and revised estimation methods. In order to provide a single measure of potential output, the chosen measure is "one which represents the levels of real GDP, and associated rates of growth, which are sustainable over the medium term at a stable rate of in ‡ation" (Giorno et al. 1995) . Our results are virtually identical if instead by dividing by potential GDP we divide by actual GDP. Fortunately the qualitative nature of our results is una¤ected by the de…nition used.
The 10 largest …scal adjustments
We begin with some suggestive evidence regarding the ten largest …scal adjustments in our sample. In Table 1 we report in order of cumulative size, the ten largest ones identi…ed as follows: the ten cases in which the cumulative cyclically adjusted de…cit reductions obtained by summing consecutive years of de…cit reductions is the largest. Obviously one could think of alternative de…nitions but our qualitative results do not change. For instance we obtained very similar …ndings using a classi…cation of the largest multi year …scal adjustments used by Alcidi and Gros (2010) .
Many of the episodes listed in our Table 1 have been made "famous" by a lively literature which has investigated the economic characteristic and degree of success of these episodes. 4 In addition to the size of the adjustments in terms of de…cit reduction we also report measures of the composition of the adjustment arising from spending cuts and tax increases over GDP. We calculate this variable by dividing the share of spending cuts over the reductions of …scally adjusted de…cits (in shares of potential GDP). Note that the spending share can be greater than 100 if taxes were actually cut during the adjustment or can be negative if spending was increased. We focus on this variable since the evidence shows that spending based …scal adjustments have been more long lasting and more successful in achieving …scal balance with lower costs in terms of lost growth. 5 With "termination" we imply that there was an election in the period of the adjustments and/or in the two years following the end of it. We include the two years after the end of the …scal adjustment because the results of an election within two years after the end of the period of de…cit reduction could be a¤ected by the tight …scal policy quite directly. Beyond two years too much time may have elapsed to attribute reelection (or defeat) mainly to the …scal adjustment. In any event our results do not quantitatively change if we include all terminations following the last year of the …scal adjustments, even beyond two years. The last column, labelled "change in ideology" indicates how many changes in the political orientation occur during the …scal adjustment and in the two years which followed its end.
The table below shows that government changes occurred in 7 cases out of 19 terminations, thus they were about 37 percent of the total. But if we look at the …ve largest adjustments in cumulative size, the ratio decreases considerably, as changes in government occurred only in 1 case out of 10. On the contrary, there were about 40 percent of government changes over the total number of terminations from 1975 to 2008 for the countries sampled in the table, meaning that periods of large …scal adjustments were not associated with higher government turnover.
Secondly the table allows us to make some preliminary observations about the link between cabinet change and the composition of …scal adjustments. Considering the percentage of the adjustment due to cut in expenditures, and comparing the …ve …scal adjustments for which the value was highest with the remaining adjustments, we …nd that expenditure based adjustments were associated with less frequent change in government. In the table below, if we pool together data for Ireland (1986-89), Canada (1993-97), Finland (1993-98), Belgium (1982 Belgium ( -1987 an Sweden (1994-2000), we get that government change occurred only in 20 percent of cases. Instead, for the rest of the countries considered, government changed in 56 percent of cases. This …rst evidence seems to suggest that tax-based adjustments make it more di¢ cult for incumbent governments to be reappointed when they implement large …scal adjustments.
De…cit reductions and elections

Simple statistics
We now turn to a more systematic analysis of de…cit reduction policies in OECD countries. We de…ne a year of "large …scal adjustment" one in which the cyclically adjusted de…cit over potential GDP ratio fell by more than 1.5 per cent of GDP while a year of "…scal adjustment" is one in which the cyclically adjusted de…cit over potential GDP ratio falls by any amount. Thus, large …scal adjustments are a subset of all the adjustments. Fiscal expansions are de…ned identically to …scal adjustments but with the opposite sign.
With the de…nition of a "large …scal adjustment", and given that the de…cit is cyclically adjusted, one tries to capture years in which …scal policy was decisively contractionary with, most likely, active discretionary …scal policies which were not business as usual or the result of the cycle. When we use the cyclically adjusted de…nition of primary de…cit (COCHDEF), we …nd 294 years (over 646 total) of …scal adjustments and 60 years of "large" …scal adjustments in our sample. We have more years of large …scal adjustments if we consider not potential but actual GDP at the denominators of the ratios, but our results on the electoral consequences are completely unchanged.
In this section we examine the link between the timing of …scal adjustments and the timing of changes in government. In order to measure "changes of government" we use two variables, one is all changes of a Prime Minister (ALLCH), the other one is change of the Prime Minister and in the party composition of the government (IDEOCH). 7 The …rst variable may overestimate "change", since a new Prime Minister with the same party or coalition may simply be a routine personnel replacement in a stable and reelected government. The variable IDEOCH may underestimate political turnover because even without a change in the party composition of the government, a Prime Minister may be changed because he/she may have become unpopular possibly as a result of a …scal tightening.
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the frequency of ALLCH and IDEOCH in the election year against cyclically adjusted de…cit reductions of di¤erent sizes and …scal expansions in the two years before the election, and we do not …nd evidence that …scal adjustments are associated with more frequent changes in government or prime minister. Figure 1 investigates the frequency of change in government and/or prime minister (ALLCH). The left-hand set of bars in the …gure indicates the frequency of change when the adjustment takes place one year before the election. The …rst two bars from the left show the average value of ALLCH when there is a …scal adjustment and a …scal expansion. There is a slightly higher propensity for a government turnover after a …scal expansion, even though the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant; the third and fourth bar show equivalent statistics but divide …scal adjustments by size. They seem to show that large adjustments are associated with lower propensity to government changes. The same picture emerges when we consider adjustment two years before the elections.
In Figure 2 we consider only government changes, de…ned as changes in the political orientation of the government (IDEOCH). Figure 2 provides comparable results to Figure 1 , except for the fact that the dependent variable is now IDEOCH instead of ALLCH. This …gure does not show that incumbent governments are systematically voted out of o¢ ce when they implement de…cit reductions. The results we get in Figure 2 are similar to those we got in Figure  1 , as they show that …scal expansions (i.e. increases in de…cits) are on average associated with higher government change than …scal adjustments. Figure 3 sheds some light on the relationship between the composition of the adjustment and government turnover. We label large adjustments as expenditure based when spending cuts are greater than the median spending cut of all large …scal adjustments. They are tax-based if the increase in tax revenues is greater than the median tax increase of all large …scal adjustments. Consistently with the preliminary evidence provided in the …rst part of this paper, Figure 3 shows that if a large …scal adjustment is expenditure-based, it is less likely that there will be a government change than if the de…cit reduction is tax-based. This result holds both when we look at ALLCH and IDEOCH.
fewer large adjustments than in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 7 Excluding from the count of ALLCH the cases in which term limits were binding, like the second term of an American President, leave our results unchanged.
Regression analysis
In this section we run several regressions which try to predict the likelihood or reappointment of an incumbent government as a function of several political and economic variables, including changes in the de…cit, taxes and spending. The bottom line of these regressions is that it is di¢ cult to …nd any economic variable (with the possible exception of in ‡ation) which is sistematically and robustly correlated with the probability of a government defeat in a election. This holds as well for …scal variables: we …nd no evidence that spending cuts, tax increases and de…cit reduction policies make it more likely for incumbents to loose.
Our interpretation is that political change is the result of a complex political game and it is hard to pin point stable correlations between economic variables and electoral results. 8 The important point of our purpose here is precisely that a …scal adjustment is only one of the many components of such political dynamics and it is not a "deal breaker" so that no matter what else is happening it implies an electoral defeat. If that were the case we should …nd a correlation between the occurence of …scal adjustments and electoral losses.
We have tried many speci…cations of our probit regression in which the left hand side variables are measures of government changes. We …rst adopted the same speci…cation by Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) and then we explored many others. We …rst report probit regressions with the variable measuring cabinet change (IDEOCH) as our dependent variable. To study the impact of …scal adjustments on cabinet change, and to test for the robustness of our results, we use three di¤erent measures: the change in non-cyclically adjusted de…cit (CHDEF), the change in cyclically adjusted de…cit (COCHDEF) and the average change in de…cit during the tenure of the current cabinet (TOTCHDEF). In our baseline speci…cation, we also include macroeconomic variables such as the change in real GDP (dGDP), the change in unemployment rate (dUNR) and the in ‡ation rate (INFL). We then use political variables to control for three di¤erent characteristics of the cabinet: the number of year the cabinet has been in power (DURAT), whether it is composed of a coalition of parties (COAL) and whether it has the majority in the parliament (MAJ). Table 2 presents the results of our baseline speci…cation. It shows that the de…cit variables are statistically not signi…cant irrespective of the measure we use, suggesting that governments implementing …scal tightening are on average not penalized at the following election. INFL (the in ‡ation rate) is statistically signi…cant in all regressions. It seems that voters are especially averse to in‡ation. Brander and Drazen (2008) …nd a similar result for a di¤erent (larger) set of countries and a di¤erent (earlier) time period. The coe¢ cients on the other macroeconomic variables are of the sign one would expect, but they are not statistically signi…cant in many speci…cations. They show that an increase in the growth rate of real GDP reduces the probability of a government change, whereas an increase in the unemployment rate increases the probability of a government change. The signs of the coe¢ cients on political variables are also consistent with conventional wisdom, although only DURAT is statistically signi…cant. As we would expect, the probability of government change increases with the lenght of its tenure.
In Table 3 we extend this baseline speci…cation by including variables in deviation from the weighted average of G7 countries. 9 Thus we use GDP growth, in ‡ation rate and unemployment rate in deviations from G7 average in every year. The motivation is clear: we test whether voters punish government not for their performance per se but with respect to its performance relative to the "world average". As before, we do not …nd evidence of a statistically signi…-cant relation between the change in …scal de…cit and government change in the direction predicted by the conventional wisdom. No coe¢ cients on de…cit variables are statistically signi…cant, as in table 2. Once again this result is fully consistent with those found by Brander and Drazen (2008) . Also when we look at macroeconomic and political variables, our results do not vary substantially from the ones obtained in the previous speci…cation.
In Table 4 we use the same speci…cations as before but run the regressions only on de…cit reduction years. Regressions on this restricted sample allow us to check for the robustness of the results we obtained while considering the full sample, and to assess if the sample of …scal adjustment years di¤ers signi…cantly. The estimated coe¢ cients on the variables measuring the change of public de…cit are not substantially di¤erent from those obtained in the previous set of regressions. They are not statistically signi…cant except for TOTCHDEF, whose e¤ect on IDEOCH is positive, meaning that a reduction in the size of the adjustment increases the probability of government change. Thus, even when we restrict the analysis to de…cit reduction years, there is no evidence that …scal tightening harms incumbent governments by reducing the probability of their reelection. Coe¢ cients on macroeconomic and political variables do not di¤er from the previous set of regressions either, showing that in most regressions only the rate of in ‡ation (INFL) and the duration of tenure (DURAT) have a statistically signi…cant positive e¤ect on IDEOCH. As before, the results are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring deviations of macroeconomic variables from G7 countries'weighted average values.
In Table 5 we include the variables which control for the composition of the …scal adjustment. Also we check whether adjustments based on cuts in transfer-payments or in government-wage consumption are associated with a higher probability of cabinet changes. We focus on large adjustments (those such that de…cit to GDP is cut by more than 1.5 percentage points from t-1 to t) and add four variables to control for the composition of the adjustment namely PEXP, PTAX, PTRF and PCGW: the share of adjustment on total expenditure, total revenues, transfers and government wages respectively. We focus on transfers and wages because results by Alesina Perotti and Tavares (1998) suggested that these were the most successful adjustments in terms of a 9 Weights for each country are calculated using real GDP. long lasting solubilization of the debt/GDP ratio. They may also be the least popular, at least according to the conventional wisdom.
Although we get statistically insigni…cant coe¢ cients for all variables of …scal composition, it is worth spending some more words on the sign of the coe¢ -cients associated with the variables. The sign of the coe¢ cient on PEXP, a dummy variable equal to one if the adjustment is large and expenditure based, is negative, meaning that if an adjustment is large and expenditure-based it is associated with a reduction in the probability of a change of government. Similarly, if we look at PTAX, a dummy variable equal to one if the adjustment is large and tax-based, we get a positive coe¢ cient, meaning that it is more likely that there will be a government change if the de…cit reduction is based on an increase in taxes. We then analyze PTRF and PCGW, dummy variables associated with large adjustments based on cuts in transfer payments and government-wage consumption respectively. For both variables we get negative and statistically insigni…cant coe¢ cients, which suggests that if the adjustment is based on cuts in these categories of expenditure, it is less likely that the government will change. When we repeat the analysis using cyclically adjusted de…cit (COCHDEF) we obtain similar results.
Finally, if we repeat the same analysis with ALLCH as the dependent variables, we …nd very similar evidence for variables measuring the change in …scal de…cit. All these results are available from the authors. While the coe¢ cients on macroeconomic and political variables are left unchanged in most of the cases, there are small di¤erences in the coe¢ cients on …scal de…cit variables. When we run the same speci…cation of Table 2 on ALLCH, results are analogous as before. Similarly, when we run the same regressions only on …scal adjustments years (as we did in Table 4 ), we get that only the coe¢ cient on TOTCHDEF is di¤erent: although it is positive as before, it is not statistically signi…cant.
Lastly, to check the robustness of our results, we run a battery of regressions using logit model and logit …xed e¤ects model, in which we control for country …xed e¤ects (Table 6 ). The estimations we get are not substantially di¤erent from the ones we get in our probit speci…cation. In particular using the same speci…cation of Table 2 and Table 3 the estimations obtained using a logit …xed e¤ects model are consistent with previous results. The evidence suggest that DURAT and UNR are positive and statistically signi…cant while INFL is always positive but not statistically signi…cant in all the speci…cations. Once again, none of the de…cit variables are statistically signi…cant.
Reverse causality
Thus far we uncovered no evidence suggesting that governments which engage in even large …scal adjustments are systematically voted out of o¢ ce. A question which comes to mind is one of a sort of "reverse causation." Perhaps those governments which are "strong" are those which can safely engage in …scal adjustments and they are then reappointed "despite" having been …scally responsible.
Note that the question is not whether or not "stronger" government implement more …scal adjustments (an issue studied by Alesina Ardagna and Trebbi (2006)) but whether stronger governments which implement …scal adjustments are more likely to be reelected than weaker governments which implement …scal adjustments. In other words, a weaker government may have a harder time breaking some impediment to implement reforms, but once it does it, the question is whether it su¤ers more at the polls than a stronger government.
The di¢ culty is how to de…ne, ex ante, i.e. before reelection (or loss) what a "strong" government is, in a way which is measurable by the econometricians. Our …rst measure of strength is whether or not the ruling government is a formed by a coalition of parties. The idea is that coalition governments are more likely to su¤er from internal disagreements (for decisions that include the nature and size of …scal adjustments to be implemented) and they may be more likely to fall. The evidence does indeed suggest that the average duration of coalition governments is slightly shorter than single party government. In our sample coalition governments last on average 4.12 years while single party governments last 4.20 years. Besides, if we look at the frequency of government change, we …nd that the probability of cabinet change is slightly higher (0.38) when a coalition government is in power at election time than when a single party government in charge (0.34).
Results are consistent when we analyze the "strength" of a government in terms of the share of votes they received at the election and not in terms of the composition of the executive. Obviously the duration of a government is endogenous to policy choices, therefore coalitions may choose certain policies which are less likely to be unpopular, which is precisely the point debated here.
Our second measure of government stability is a dummy variable equal to one if the party of the executive has an absolute majority in the house(s) with lawmaking powers. This measure seems reasonable since one would expect a government to last longer if it has the majority in all houses. In fact we …nd that when this is the case (as measured by the variable MAJ), the government lasts on average 4.41 years, whereas for the rest of the observations the average duration is 4.17 years. However, di¤erently from the evidence presented for the coalition variable, we get that governments holding the majority in the houses are more likely to change than the rest (45 percent of cases versus 34).
We can then proceed and use the variables de…ned above to investigate the main issue of this section: are more stable governments more likely to implement …scal adjustments? Do they do so because they are more likely to be reappointed "despite" they have been …scally responsible?
Our results show that coalition governments implemented 161 …scal adjustments, corresponding to roughly 47 percent of total observations for which we had a coalition government, whereas single party governments implemented 133 …scal adjustments, i.e. they did it in 52 percent of the years in which they were governing. If we only look at "large" …scal adjustments results are similar with previous ones. Coalition governments implemented 34 large …scal adjustments, corresponding to roughly 9.9 percent of total observations for which we had a coalition government, whereas single party governments implemented 26 …scal adjustments, that is to say 10.1 percent of the years in which they were governing. If we then look at the stability of the government as measured by the majority in the houses, we …nd similar di¤erences between governments with an absolute majority and government without an absolute majority in the houses when we look at large …scal adjustments.The former implemented large adjustments in 10.3 percent of cases, the latter in 9.9 percent of cases. When instead we look at all adjustments the di¤erence is not so clear cut. Governments with the majority implemented 61 …scal adjustments, which represent 48 percent of the years where a government with an absolute majority was in charge. Government without the majority implemented 229 …scal adjustments, about 49 percent of the total (See Table 7 ). So according to our, admittedly imperfect, measure of "strength" it seems that "strong" governments implement …scal adjustments only slightly more often than average.
Moreover the evidence provided in …gures 4 to 7 does not always suggest that more stable governments implementing …scal adjustments before the election were more likely to be reappointed. For example …gure 5 shows that if single party governments implemented …scal adjustments two years before the election they were more likely not to be reelected than if coalition governments did so. Similarly, governments with an absolute majority in the houses were associated with government change in 33 percent of cases if they implemented …scal adjustments one year before the election, compared to 31 percent in the rest of our sample (see …gure 7).
The idea that more stable governments are not more protected from government change after they perfom a …scal adjustment is also supported by the set of regressions we show in tables 8 and 9. We add interaction variables to the baseline speci…cation described above and try to capture the speci…c e¤ect on government change associated with more stable governments implementing …s-cal adjustments. Although there is a statistically signi…cant di¤erence between single party and coalition governments when we look at column 2 of table 8, suggesting that coalition governments are less likely to be reelected when they implement a …scal adjustment, this evidence does not survive to the remaining speci…cations. In column 4 of table 8, when we use a cyclically adjusted de…cit variable, we do not …nd a statistically signi…cant di¤erence between coalition and single parties, and similarly in column 6, when we construct a variable interacting TOTCHDEF and COAL, we do not …nd any statistically signi…cant e¤ect of this variable on the dependent variable IDEOCH.
The evidence that "stronger" governments are not necessarily more protected from electoral turnover is also supported by our results in table 9 . In all speci…cations where we include an interaction variable between the de…cit variable and a dummy for the government having majority support in the parliament, we don't get statistically signi…cant estimates for the coe¢ cients on the interaction variable.
Discussion
If it is the case that certain types of …scal adjustments are not necessarily costly in terms of lost output or lost votes, why are they often delayed and politicians reluctant to implement them?
There are two possible, related reasons. The …rst is that "vote-counting" is not the only political factor at play. Certain constituencies may be able to "block" adjustments to continue receiving rents from government spending because they have enough political energy (time, organization, money). This is sometimes referred to as an issue of di¤use bene…ts and concentrated costs. For example, in some cases strikes of public-sector employees may create serious disruptions. Pensioners'lobbies may be able to persuade politicians not to touch their pension systems even when future generations will su¤er the costs of delayed reforms. Lobbyists for certain protected sectors use campaign contributions for continued protection.
A second and related problem is what Alesina and Drazen (1990) modeled as a "war of attrition" political game. Political con ‡icts over the allocation of costs of the budget cuts or tax increases, for example, lead to a stalemate that requires time to be resolved. Postponing an adjustment may be costly, but all sides hope to be able to shield themselves from such costs, and the "war" continues until one side gives in. Thus, more polarized political systems and fractionalized societies, where "deals" and compromises are more di¢ cult to reach quickly, should have a harder time stabilizing. Another implication is that a political consolidation of a stable and secure cohesive majority may be a precondition for a …scal consolidation. Finally, this model is consistent with the "crisis hypothesis,"namely that the idea that a sharp deterioration of the economic situation may lead to reforms. In this case, a …scal consolidation occurs simply because it becomes too costly to continue to postpone.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined in some details the evidence supporting the conventional wisdom that …scally "tight" governments are loose popularity in elections and …scally loose ones win. We found surprisingly little evidence supporting this conventional wisdom; there is remarkably little evidence of this preference for voters for budget de…cits relative to the conviction with which this view is held by politicians, commentators, political scientists and economists. More precisely we found no evidence that even large reductions of budget de…cits are associated with electoral losses.
The biggest counter argument is one of reverse causation, namely strong and popular government can implement …scal adjustment and be reelected "despite" such policies, thus only these government do so. Our attempts to uncover these reverse causation does not provide convincing evidence that our result are only driven by this e¤ect. Needless to say it is di¢ cult to measure "strength" of a government, ex ante, and therefore our test should be taken cautiously. But we believe that a cautious conclusion is warranted: reasonably solid governments not on the verge of losing an election anyway can engage in …scal adjustments, even aggressive ones and survive the next election. CHREV : Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. Public revenues are computed as governement current receipts less gross governemnt interest receipts.
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National Accounts Data
CHDEF : Change in public de…cit: percentage point change in the ratio of public de…cit to GDP. Calculated as CHEXP less CHREV:
CHT RF : Change in transfers to households: percentage point change in the ratio of transfers to households to GDP.
CHSU B : Change in subsidies: percentage point change in the ratio of subsidies to GDP.
COCHEXP : Change in government expenditures (CHEXP ), corrected for the cycle: percentage point change in the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary expenditures to potential GDP.
COCHREV : Change in government revenues (CHREV ), corrected for the cycle: percentage point change in the ratio of cyclically adjusted government revenues to potential GDP.
COCHDEF : Change in the primary de…cit (CHDEF ), corrected for the cycle: calculated as COCHEXP less COCHREV .
T OT CHDEF : Average change in de…cit during tenure: average percentage point change in the de…cit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. That is the average of CHDEF for the years from the last termination up to the current year.
GDP : Rate of growth of real GDP, percent. Computed as the percentage change of the variable "Gross domestic product, volume, at 2000 ppp".
T OT GDP : Average growth during tenure: average growth rate from the time when a cabinet came to power, up to current year, percent.
GDP G7 : Growth of G7 countries: weighted average growth rate of the G7 countries, percent. Weights for each country are calculated using real GDP.
GDP g7 : Growth relative to the G7 countries: calculated as GDP less GDP G7. U N R : Unemployment rate, percent.
U N R : Growth of the unemployment rate, percent:
T OT U N R : Average unemployment growth during tenure: average annual growth rate of unemployment rate from beginning of cabinet's tenure to current year, percent.
U N Rg7 : Unemployment rate relative to the G7 countries: unemployment rate less the GDP-weighted average of the G7 unemployment rate, percentage points.
IN F L :
In ‡ation: rate of change of the GDP de ‡ator, percent. It is constucted using the variable "Gross domestic product, de ‡ator, market prices".
T OT IN F L : Average in ‡ation during tenure: average rate of in ‡ation from the beginning of cabinet's tenure to current year, percent.
IN F Lg7 : In ‡ation rate relative to the G7 countries: in ‡ation rate less the GDP-weighted average of the G7 in ‡ation rate, percentage points.
P EXP : Spending-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold:
1. there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < -1.5); 2. CHEXP is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
P T AX : Tax-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold:
1. there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < -1.5); 2. CHREV is more than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
P T RF :
Transfer-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold:
1. there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < -1.5); 2. CHT RF is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
P CGW : Government wage-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when the following two conditions hold:
1. there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < 1.5); 2. CHCGW is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
N IN T RT g7 : Relative nominal interest rate: long term nominal interest rate (ten-year treasury notes) of a given country less the GDP-weighted average of long nominal interest rates in the G7 countries, percentage points.
RIN T RT : Real interest rate: ten-year interest rate minus the growth rate of the GDP de ‡ator, percent.
RIN T RT g7 : Relative real interest rate: ten-year real interest rate of a given country less the GDP-weighted average of real interest rates in the G7 countries. T ERM : Government termination: dummy variable equal to 1 in any year in which a government ends, regardless of the reason. A termination may or may not involve a "change" in cabinet ideology or prime minister.
Cabinet data
DU RAT : Duration: integer number of years that a cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. A cabinet that falls during its …rst year in power is counted as 1. Every time there is a government termination (T ERM = 1), DU RAT is reset to 1 the year after the termination.
SIN G : Single party: dummy variable equal to 1 if a single party cabinet is in power.
COAL : Coalition: dummy variable equal to 1 if a coalition cabinet (including ministers from two or more parties) is in power.
M AJ : Majority: dummy variable equal to 1 if the cabinet has majority support in parliament.
IDEOCH : Change in ideology of cabinet: dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the ideology index between the current year and the next. It is constructed by exploiting the change in the value of variable EXECRLC (describing the ideology of the chief executive's party) in the DPI dataset.
ALLCH : Change of ideology or prime minister; dummy variable equal to 1 if either IDEOCH or P M CH is equal to 1. Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 2. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 3. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 4. Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP. 5. Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. When TOTCHDEF is used, given variables are replaced by dTOTGDP, dTOTUNR and TOTINFL. The coefficients on DGDP , DUNR and INFL are the coefficients on these variables. 
